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We study a three-strategy spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with imitation and logit update rules.
Players can follow the always-cooperating, always-defecting or the win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) strategies and
gain their payoff from games with their direct neighbors on a square lattice. The friendliness parameter of
the WSLS strategy—characterizing its cooperation probability in the first round—tunes the cyclic component
of the game determining whether the game can be characterized by a potential. We measured and calculated
the phase diagrams of the system for a wide range of parameters. When the game is a potential game and the
logit rule is applied, the theoretically predicted phase diagram agrees very well with the simulation results.
Surprisingly, this phase diagram can be accurate even in the nonpotential case if there are only two surviving
strategies in the stationary state; this result harmonizes with the fact that all 2 × 2 games are potential games. For
the imitation dynamics, we found that the effects of spatiality combined with the presence of two cooperative
strategies are so strong that they suppress even substantial changes in the payoff matrix, thus the phase diagrams
are independent of the cyclic component’s intensity. At the same time, this type of strategy update mechanism
supports the formation of cooperative clusters that results in a cooperative society in a wider parameter range
compared to the logit dynamics.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.92.012813 PACS number(s): 89.65.−s, 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
The mathematical explanation of the ubiquitous coopera-
tion is one of the greatest challenges of our days. Evolutionary
game theory [1–6] offers a suitable framework to study this
conundrum. This interdisciplinary research tool incorporates
the assets of mathematics, biology, physics, economy, sociol-
ogy, and other disciplines and creates an ideal environment
to investigate the evolutionary processes taking place in
populations.
In this paper, we examine the evolution of cooperation using
a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) [6–8] model characterizing the
sharpest social dilemma situation that can emerge in a scenario
of conflicting interests. In a PD encounter, the two participating
individuals have the option to choose between cooperation (C)
and defection (D). Depending on their decisions, they earn
different payoffs. Mutual cooperation (defection) results in
the reward R (punishment P ), a defector encountering a co-
operator earns the temptation T , and the exploited cooperator
gets the sucker’s payoff S. Due to the T > R > P > S payoff
ranking that characterizes the PD, the choice to defect results
in higher earning than the choice to cooperate; however, if
both players think along this argumentation, they end up with
the second-worst payoff P instead of the second-best R that
could be achieved by mutual cooperation. This outlines the
dilemma.
This reasoning shows that mutual defection is the Nash
equilibrium in the one-shot PD. Cooperation needs additional
mechanisms to emerge: One of these is to turn the interaction
between the two players to a repeated game. In the iterated
PD (IPD) setup, players play more rounds of one-shot PD
games with each other and their success is measured by
the total (or the average) payoff they acquire during this
longer interaction sequence. Along this change, a plethora
of possible strategies become accessible that can promote
cooperation as, during the longer interaction, players can
utilize the information gathered in the previous rounds. In our
model, players can adopt three types of strategies: in addition
to the simple always-cooperating AllC and always-defecting
AllD, the win-stay lose-shift (WSLS) strategy is available for
them. WSLS evaluates the outcome of the last round and if
the earned payoff was below a given threshold, then the player
changes his or her action for the next round. Players with this
strategy possess a friendliness parameter that characterizes
how cooperative they are in the first round. WSLS proved
to be very effective in promoting cooperation in many cases
due to its resilience against errors [9,10]. It is already
clarified that the effect of memory [11], the competition
between the aspiration levels [12], and the stochastic effects
in systems with structured populations [13,14] can improve
the efficiency of the WSLS strategy in the maintenance of
cooperation.
We have chosen these three strategies because the resulting
3 × 3 payoff matrix has peculiar properties. Recently, it
was discovered [15] that all symmetric 3 × 3 games can
be decomposed into the linear combination of a potential
game matrix and a cyclic component. Potential games are
convenient in the sense that they behave as many well-known
physical systems: The random sequential application of the
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logit rule [16–20] drives potential games to a state where the
stationary strategy distribution is determined by the Boltzmann
distribution. The remaining cyclic component is responsible
for the probability currents between the microscopic states
that drive the system out of equilibrium [21,22]. In our model,
the friendliness parameter can be tuned so the payoff matrix
describes a pure potential game. Changing the parameter
introduces the cyclic component and thus the effect of cyclicity
can be investigated in a controlled environment.
We study the model in a spatial setting [5,23–29] where the
interaction network is defined by a square lattice. Players play
IPD games with their four nearest neighbors and acquire their
accumulated payoff from them. To have a deeper understand-
ing of the emerging phenomena, we study two types of update
mechanisms. Imitation [30,31] is an update method widely
used in evolutionary game theory on the analogy of biological
processes: Players compare their payoff with those around
them and try to adopt more successful strategies played by their
peers. Spatiality proved to be beneficial for cooperation when
this rule is applied as it fosters the formation of cooperative
clusters. Clustered cooperators can support each other and can
protect the cluster from defector attacks. The other update
rule is the so-called logit rule originating from economy and
physics models. Here players are able to calculate their payoff,
taking into account every available strategy assuming their
coplayers do not change their strategies. They exponentially
prefer to choose the strategy that bids the highest prospects
for them. In the low-noise limit, the logit rule coincides to a
best response dynamics [32,33]. This rule is an important link
between evolutionary game theory and equilibrium statistical
physics because, for multiagent potential games, the random
sequential logit rule drives the system into a Boltzmann
distribution [16].
In our analysis we found that the analytical phase diagram
agrees very well with the results provided by the logit rule.
For most parameter values, it is accurate even in the case when
cyclicity is present in the system. Further examination of the
results reveals that they coincide at the interfaces where only
two types of strategies are present. This surprising result can be
explained by the fact that all 2 × 2 games are potential games,
thus the potential analysis can result in a good prediction at
these places. In the case of imitation dynamics, unconditional
cooperators were eliminated due to the joint effect of spatiality
and the presence of a more competitive cooperative strategy.
These collective effects suppress the differences in the payoff
matrix and make the phase diagram independent of the cyclic
component’s intensity. Comparing the two strategy update
mechanisms, we can point out that imitation fosters the spread
of cooperative behavior in a wider parameter range due to the
strong cluster formation mechanism.
The paper is structured in the following way: In the
next section we give a description about the model and the
technical details of the simulations. In Sec. III, we study
analytically the case when the game is a pure potential game
and calculate the related phase diagram. In Secs. IV and V, we
specify the simulation results for the logit and the imitation
update mechanisms, respectively, and compare them with the
analytical predictions along with a detailed discussion of the
results. Finally, in Sec. VI we summarize our findings.
II. MODEL
We consider a spatial evolutionary model where players
play IPD games with their neighbors. In a one-shot PD
encounter, the players can choose between cooperation (C)
and defection (D) and earn different payoffs depending on
their simultaneous decisions. Mutual cooperation (defection)
results in the reward R (punishment P ), a successful defector
exploiting a cooperator gets the temptation T while the victim
of the exploitation receives the sucker’s payoff S. The payoffs
in the PD satisfy the T > R > P > S ranking. Without loss of
generality, we can fix two values of the payoff matrix thus we
set the reward to 1 (R = 1) and the punishment to 0 (P = 0),
leaving us with two payoff parameters. In an IPD, players play
PD games repeatedly with each other, gathering a long-term
payoff. Their success is best measured by the averaged payoff
they acquire during this longer interaction sequence. Players
can adopt three types of strategies: AllC, AllD, or win-stay-
lose-shift with different friendliness parameter w. AllC (AllD)
players always cooperate (defect), while WSLS players choose
an action depending on the outcome of the last round of the
IPD. They have a payoff expectation level; if their payoff in
the last round was below this level, then they choose a different
action in the next round (they switch from C to D or from D to
C). If their payoff is above the expectation level, they stick to
the action they used in the previous round. In the case of the
PD, this level is set somewhere between R(=1) and P (=0); for
easier reference, we can set it to 0.5. Translating this threshold
value to actual actions means that a WSLS player will stick
to his or her action after a successful exploitation or after
mutual cooperation and he or she will change his or her action
after mutual defection (from D to C) or after being cheated
(from C to D). This rule determines the long-term behavior
of WSLS; however, the first round action is not decided. The
friendliness parameter w (0  w  1) defines the probability
of cooperation in the first round; consequently, high w can be
associated with a friendly behavior. To facilitate the analysis
(by getting rid of an additional model parameter) we study the
limit of infinitely iterated PD in this paper.
Players are located on the nodes of a square lattice of the
size N = L × L. Using the matrix formalism, the strategy of
the player in the spatial position x, sx takes the form of one of
the three-dimensional unit vectors:
AllD ≡
⎛
⎝
1
0
0
⎞
⎠, AllC ≡
⎛
⎝
0
1
0
⎞
⎠, or WSLS ≡
⎛
⎝
0
0
1
⎞
⎠. (1)
In this framework, the accumulated payoff gained from the
neighbors on the square lattice can be calculated as
ux
(
sx,sx
) =
∑
y∈x
sTx · Msy, (2)
where sTx is the transpose of the player’s strategy vector and
sx denotes the strategy profile of players in the interaction
neighborhood x of player x. In the case of the square lattice,
the summation runs over the four nearest neighbors of player x.
The matrix M is of the following form, taking into account the
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long-term payoffs between strategy pairs in the IPD encounters
M =
⎡
⎢⎣
0 T T/2
S 1 w + (1 − w)S
S/2 w + (1 − w)T 1
⎤
⎥⎦. (3)
It can be seen that in the limit of the infinitely repeated
PD, the result of the first round does not always influence the
long-term average payoff of the opposing strategies; w does
not show up in every WSLS-related entry of the payoff matrix.
After the games with their neighbors, players have the
option to revise their strategy and adopt a more successful
one in accord with the evolutionary aspect of the model. As
we already mentioned in the Introduction, we study two types
of strategy update methods.
In the case of the pairwise imitation rule, player x compares
his or her payoff with one of his or her randomly chosen
neighbor’s (y) payoff and adopts the neighbor’s strategy with
a probability W (sx ← sy) depending on the payoff difference
as
W (sx ← sy) = 11 + exp[(ux − uy)/K] , (4)
where K is associated with errors in the decision making
that can originate from various sources (emotions, free will,
fluctuation in the payoffs, external effects, noise) and, as a
consequence, less-successful strategies can also be imitated
with a low probability [5,34]. In the low-K limit, however,
the more successful strategies are almost always imitated. The
inverse of this parameter is also known as the intensity of
selection [35].
The other studied strategy update method is the logit rule.
In this case, players check the payoff they could gather
by adopting any of the available strategies, provided their
neighbors stick to their present strategies. Players adopt a
strategy (or keep their strategies) depending on these expected
payoff values:
Pr(s′x) =
exp
[
ux
(
s′x,sx
)/
K
]
∑
s′′x∈ exp
[
ux
(
s′′x,sx
)/
K
] . (5)
Pr(s′x) defines the probability for player x to select strategy
s′x ∈ {AllD,AllC,WSLS}, where ux(s′x,sx ) is her expected
payoff when playing strategy s′x while her neighbors keep
playing their present strategies.  denotes the full strategy
set in the model, i.e.,  = {AllD,AllC,WSLS}. K indicates
the measure of noise here as well that makes possible the
appearance of less successful strategies. The probability of
choosing a strategy with smaller expected payoff grows with
increasing K .
During the Monte Carlo (MC) simulations, we study the
model on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions.
The system size—when not stated otherwise—is N = 200 ×
200 = 40 000. In most cases, simulations are started with
random initial conditions where, initially, players can adopt
one of the three available strategies with equal probability.
However, in some cases, we used prepared initial states to make
the cluster-growing process faster and to avoid the unwanted
finite-size effects: we started the system from a state where
each 10 × 10 block could be occupied either homogeneously
by one of the strategies or by the AllC-AllD chessboard
structure with equal probability. For the phase diagrams,
stationary strategy concentrations were obtained by averaging
the concentrations after a transient time of ttr = 50 000 Monte
Carlo steps (MCS) over a ts = 10 000 MCS sampling time.
The averaging parameters are adjusted to the system behavior.
In one MCS, each player has the option to modify his or her
strategy once on average in a random sequential order.
III. ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS FOR THE POTENTIAL
GAME CASE (w = 0.5)
In a recently published paper [15], it was shown that all
symmetric two-player three-strategy games can be decom-
posed into the linear combination of nine elementary 3 × 3
game matrices [M = ∑k β(k)g(k),k = 1, . . . ,9] where the
matrices g(k) are considered as orthonormal basis vectors
in the corresponding nine-dimensional vector space, i.e.,∑
ij gij (k)gij (l) = δkl , with δkl being Kronecker’s δ. For the
decomposition, the coefficients β(k) can be calculated as
β(k) =
3∑
i,j=1
gij (k)Mij . (6)
The main advantage of the suggested two-dimensional Fourier
decomposition is that different games can be analyzed in a
general framework using the basis matrices. The first three
basis matrices form an important group for the analysis.
They contain uniform columns; for such payoff matrices,
the focal player’s income depends solely on the opponent’s
strategy and as such we can call these matrices cross-dependent
components. The sum of these three terms obey the following
form:
M(cross) =
3∑
k=1
β(k)g(k) =
⎛
⎜⎝
c1 c2 c3
c1 c2 c3
c1 c2 c3
⎞
⎟⎠, (7)
where cj = 13
∑3
i=1 Mij (j = 1,2, and 3). These payoffs do
not motivate a selfish individual to choose another strategy;
moreover, if the logit rule is applied, then these payoffs incline
the players to adopt a random strategy.
On the contrary, for the second important group of matrices,
the so-called self-dependent payoff components, the sum of
three basis games (k = 1,4, and 5 in the notation of paper
[15]) can be described by a matrix composed of uniform rows
as
M(self) =
⎛
⎜⎝
s1 s1 s1
s2 s2 s2
s3 s3 s3
⎞
⎟⎠, (8)
where si = 13
∑3
j=1 Mij (i = 1,2, and 3). For the self-
dependent payoff the income of a selfish player depends
only her own strategy, that is, direct interaction between the
two players is missing here as well. In this case, the logit
rule dictates the same choice for each player. As a result,
in the zero-noise limit (K → 0) players choose the strategy
providing the maximum income [max(s1,s2,s3)]. Notice that
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the first component g(1) is involved in both the cross- and
self-dependent payoffs as gij (1) = 1/3.
The direct player-player interaction is described by the
last four terms. The ninth component [the so-called rock-
scissors-paper (RSP) component] is particularly important as
it represents the cyclic dominance among the three strategies
and prevents the existence of the potential. It is found that the
cyclic component is missing [β(9) = 0] when
M12 + M23 + M31 − M21 − M32 − M13 = 0. (9)
In the absence of the RSP component the game is a potential
game and a symmetric potential matrix V (Vij = Vji for i,j =
1,2,3) can be derived from the payoff matrix M that satisfies
the following conditions:
Mij − Mi ′j = Vij − Vi ′j (10)
for each possible value of i,i ′,j = 1,2,3. Evidently, similar
conditions must be satisfied from the point of view of the
second player that ensures the mentioned symmetry of the
potential matrix. In fact, the elements of the potential matrix
V summarize the individual incentives for the active player to
modify her strategy unilaterally [36]. In a spatial multiagent
evolutionary game that is built from uniform pair interactions
described by two-player potential games, the potential for the
whole system can be given as
U (S) =
∑
〈x,y〉
sTx · Vsy, (11)
where the summation runs over the nearest neighbors on the
(square) lattice and S denotes the strategy profile of the system.
The role of the scalar function U (S) is similar to the negative
Hamiltonian of the Ising- or Potts-type models in physics.
Blume [16,17] has shown that if the evolution is controlled by
random sequential logit rule, then the system evolves into the
Boltzmann distribution where the strategy profile S is present
with a probability p(S) = eU (S)/K/Z with Z as a normalization
factor. In short, for the quantitative analysis of evolutionary
potential games with logit rule we can apply the tools and
methods of equilibrium statistical physics [37,38].
For w = 1/2, condition (9) is satisfied in our model, thus
the potential exists and a possible V can be given for this
particular case as
V =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 S S/2
S 1 + S − T 1/2 + S − T/2
S/2 1/2 + S − T/2 1 + S/2 − T/2
⎞
⎟⎠. (12)
In the knowledge of the pair potential V, one can evaluate
its maximal component that coincides with the strategy pair
preferred by players in the low-noise (K) limit. For example,
in the present spatial model all players choose defection
unconditionally (AllD strategy) if V11 is the largest component
of V. Thus we can determine the payoff region (on the
T -S plane) where this condition is satisfied. Straightforward
calculation gives that unconditional defection occurs in the
system if the payoff parameters simultaneously satisfy the
following two conditions: S < 0 and T > S + 2. It is worth
mentioning that the direct comparison of the Vij elements
gives two weaker conditions, namely T > 2S + 1 and T >
S + 1, whereas the condition S < 0 appears twice. A similar
S
T
0.5 1 1.5 2
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
PD
HD
SH
HG
AllD
AllC+
AllD
WSLS
FIG. 1. (Color online) Phase diagram determined by the maximal
value of the potential matrix (that exists for w = 1/2). Black labels
in the regions refer to the preferred strategy. In the AllC+AllD
phase, AllC and AllD players occupy the square lattice according
to a chessboard or anti-chessboard-like arrangement. Gray labels
and lines show the different social dilemma parameter regions, the
prisoner’s dilemma (PD), the hawk-dove game (HD), the staghunt
game (SH), and the harmony game (HG).
calculation can be performed for all other strategy profiles. The
result of this analysis is summarized in the phase diagram of
Fig. 1. To have a clearer picture and a deeper understanding of
the model, we have plotted the results beyond the PD parameter
limits, in the 0.5 < T < 2, −1 < S < 0.5 domain. In this
region the WSLS strategy behaves exactly the same way as
in the PD area.
If a nondiagonal element of the potential matrix (for
example, V12 or, equivalently, V21 = V12) is maximal, then
a sublattice ordered arrangement of the two strategies (in
this case AllC and AllD) is predicted to rule the system
in a chessboard or anti-chessboard-like structure. According
to the quantitative analysis, two equivalent (chessboard and
antichessboard) arrangements of AllC and AllD strategies
exist if S > 0, T > 1, and T + S > 2 simultaneously. In this
area, the matrix game has two symmetric strict, pure Nash
equilibria characteristic to the two-strategy anticoordination
games. When increasing the noise level K this system exhibits
an order-disorder phase transition resembling those described
by the antiferromagnetic Ising models [39,40]. More precisely,
the suppressed third strategy (WSLS) is present with a
low frequency, whereas a critical phase transition (sublattice
ordering) can be observed in the K dependence of the AllC
and AllD strategy frequencies. At low noise values, one
of the sublattices is occupied by AllD players while AllC
players reside in the other sublattice; above a critical noise
level (K > Kc), AllC and AllD strategies are present in both
sublattices with the same concentration.
The phase boundary separating the homogeneous WSLS
and AllD states in the low-noise limit is defined by the equation
V11 = V33 (S = T − 2 and S < 0). The competition between
the mentioned phases, however, depends on how V11 and
V33 are composed of the contributions of the self-dependent
payoffs and coordination-type interactions. These latter con-
tributions can be constructed as the linear combination of
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the matrices belonging to the third important basis matrix
group [g(6), g(7), and g(8)] defined in Ref. [15]. Within this
three-dimensional subspace of games we can distinguish three
other basis games, namely
g′(6) = 1
2
⎛
⎜⎝
1 −1 0
−1 1 0
0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ , (13)
g′(7) = 1
2
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0
0 1 −1
0 −1 1
⎞
⎟⎠ , (14)
g′(8) = 1
2
⎛
⎜⎝
1 0 −1
0 0 0
−1 0 1
⎞
⎟⎠ (15)
which represent the coordination- (or Ising) type interactions
between two of three strategies. The latter games are not
orthogonal to each other; their sum is equivalent to one
of the Fourier components corresponding to the three-state
Potts model. The games defined by Eqs. (13)–(15) span the
three-dimensional subspace of coordination-type interactions
and their strength in a game M can be characterized by the
coefficients:
β ′(k) =
3∑
i,j=1
g′ij (k)Mij , (16)
defined on the analogy of Eq. (6) for k = 6,7, and 8.
Straightforward calculation justifies that at the T = 1, S = −1
point, the three coefficients are equal [β ′(6) = β ′(7) = β ′(8)]
and the self-dependent components support the strategies AllD
and WSLS equally (s1 = s3 > s2). In other words, at this
particular point on the T -S plane, the game is equivalent to a
three-state Potts model in which an external field favors the first
and third states identically [41]. The resultant K dependence
in the strategy frequencies and the Ising-type critical phase
transition is illustrated numerically in the following section.
Above this point along the WSLS-AllD phase boundary, the
stronger attractive strength of the WSLS-WSLS interaction
[that can be quantified as β ′(7) + β ′(8)] is accompanied by
a lower self-dependent component (s3). On the contrary, for
T < 1 along the phase boundary the weaker attractive WSLS-
WSLS interaction is compensated by a stronger self-dependent
contribution to achieve V11 = V33. Due to the mentioned
differences along the phase boundary, the equivalence between
the AllD and WSLS phases is violated and the resultant
symmetry breaking prohibits the critical phase transition when
the noise level K is increased. This is demonstrated in Sec. IV
as well.
Until now we have studied the case w = 1/2 when the
existence of the potential could be exploited in the analytical
treatment. For the other cases (w 	= 1/2), the RSP component
appears in the payoff matrix with a strength of β(9) =
(w − 1/2)(T − S)/√6. The contribution of the RSP game
drives the system out of the Boltzmann distribution and breaks
the detailed balance at finite noise levels (K > 0) even if the
dynamics is controlled by the logit rule (5). On the other hand,
in the low-noise limit, the interactions of the potential games
0.0
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0.6
0.8
1.0
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te
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ue
nc
ie
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AllD
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WSLS
K
FIG. 2. (Color online) Strategy frequencies versus K with logit
rule at T = 2 and S = −0.5 for w = 1/2. The accuracy of MC results
is comparable to the line thickness.
can result in a spatially ordered strategy arrangement that
blocks the effects induced by the RSP component if β(9) does
not exceed a threshold value. The existence of such situations
is demonstrated numerically in the following section.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE LOGIT RULE
As a start, for the numerical analysis of the model with logit
update rule, we study the noise dependence of the strategy
frequencies for w = 1/2 in the parameter region where the
theoretical analysis predicted a homogeneous AllD state in the
low-noise limit. Figure 2 illustrates the MC results exhibiting
a smooth and monotonous decrease in the frequency of AllD
from 1 towards 1/3 when K is increased. Simultaneously, the
AllC and WSLS strategies appear as rare point defects at low
noise levels and their frequencies go monotonously to 1/3
in the large K limit when the players choose their strategy
at random. Similar behavior can be observed when WSLS
dominates the system at low noises. Naturally, in this case, the
role of AllD and WSLS are exchanged.
Contrary to the above typical behavior, the MC analysis
shows a critical transition in the strategy frequencies when
varying the noise level at S = −1 and T = 1. The previous
theoretical analysis has predicted the equivalence of our model
to the three-state Potts model at this point with an external field
supporting the AllD and WSLS states equally. We illustrate
the critical transition by performing two series of simulations.
The first series are started at K = 0.2 from a state where all
players use the AllD strategy. After some thermalization time tt
the average strategy frequencies are determined by averaging
over a sampling time ts . Afterward, K is increased and the
simulation is continued from the last strategy distribution. This
procedure is repeated many times; the results are indicated by
lines in Fig. 3. We emphasize that the values of tt , ts , and the
system size were increased gradually when we approached
the critical point with smaller and smaller steps in K . Using
this method, we could reduce the undesired effects of the
divergency in fluctuations, relaxation time, and correlation
length in agreement with the theoretical results of phase
transitions [42]. In the close vicinity of the critical point
tt = ts = 106 MCS are used on a square lattice of 106 sites.
012813-5
VUKOV, VARGA, ALLEN, NOWAK, AND SZAB ´O PHYSICAL REVIEW E 92, 012813 (2015)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4
K
0.6 0.8
st
ra
te
gy
 fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s AllD
AllC
WSLS
AllD
AllC
WSLS
FIG. 3. (Color online) Coincidence between the strategy fre-
quencies for two consecutive runs when K is increased gradually
during the simulations at S = −1 and T = 1 for w = 1/2. In the
first run, the system is started from homogeneous AllD state; the
average strategy frequencies are indicated by lines. In the second run,
all players use the WSLS strategy initially; strategy frequencies are
illustrated by symbols.
Figure 3 compares the previous MC data with those we
obtained when the simulation is started from a homogeneous
WSLS phase. Notice the coincidence in the strategy frequen-
cies for the two equivalent macroscopic states. Within the
statistical error our MC data are consistent with the theoretical
expectations, suggesting an Ising-type critical phase transition
at Kc = 0.56660(5).
The next plot on the strategy frequencies versus K is
addressed to illustrate the typical behavior occurring along the
WSLS-AllD phase boundary. In this case we have repeated the
latter method for T = 1.5 and S = −0.5. The MC results are
plotted in Fig. 4 in a similar manner. The most striking feature
is the absence of a critical transition due to the above mentioned
fact that here the AllD and WSLS phases are distinct. As a
result, the WSLS phase becomes unstable when K is increased
and this state is transformed into the noisy AllD phase for some
noise level when a sufficiently large island of the preferred
phase (AllD) appears via thermal fluctuations. A similar
phenomenon is described by the Ising model when considering
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Strategy frequencies versus K for two
consecutive series of runs at S = −0.5 and T = 1.5 for w = 1/2.
The notations of strategy frequencies are the same as in Fig. 3.
FIG. 5. (Color online) Strategy frequencies in the T -S plane
when the logit strategy update rule is applied for w = 1/2 and K =
0.1. Blue (very dark gray) surface indicates the average frequency of
WSLS players, red (dark gray) surface denotes the average frequency
of the AllD strategy. AllC players [green (light gray)] appear only
in the hawk-dove region, forming twofold degenerated sublattice
ordered structures together with the AllD players.
the decay of the metastable state via nucleation and growth of
the stable phase’s droplets [43]. A symmetric phenomenon
can be observed along the WSLS-AllD phase boundary for
S < −1 with the WSLS state becoming stable. We emphasize
though that this is the low-noise behavior of the system,
for high noise levels, the strategy adoption process becomes
random and the strategies are present with equal frequencies.
We have determined the phase diagram in the T -S plane
for the strategy frequencies at a low noise level with MC
simulations as well; the results are illustrated in Fig. 5. Notice
the agreement with the theoretical predictions in the case of a
potential game (w = 0.5). In the prisoner’s dilemma parameter
region, the system behavior is determined by the competition
between the AllD and WSLS strategies; the dominated AllC
strategy is present in the system with an extremely low
frequency and practically does not disturb the competition
of AllD and WSLS.
During the numerical evaluation of the phase diagram(s)
in the low-noise limit we have faced technical difficulties
related to the presence of metastable states and the relevant
initial transient phenomena when the system was started from
a random distribution of the three strategies. In agreement with
the prediction of the mean-field analysis, for most of the social
dilemmas the random initial state favors the spreading of the
AllD strategy that may be so intensive that after a short time
only isolated WSLS and AllC players remain in the system.
In fact, the extinction of WSLS domains is supported by the
early presence of AllC players who feed the defectors in their
competition against the WSLS players. WSLS players can
beat and invade the territories of AllD only if they survive
by forming a sufficiently large compact domain in the spatial
system. For small system sizes and at low noise levels this
probability may be extremely low and the system can remain
in the metastable AllD phase for a long time. For large sizes,
however, the sufficiently large WSLS domain forms within a
“short” time and afterwards the system evolves into the stable
WSLS phase via a domain growing process. In the present
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(a)
(b)
FIG. 6. (Color online) Comparison of strategy frequencies in the
T -S plane when the logit strategy update rule is applied for (a) w =
0.1 and (b) w = 0.9 at K = 0.1. The color code for the strategies is
the same as in Fig. 5.
work, our attention is focused on the determination of phase
diagrams that are valid for the N → ∞ limit in agreement with
the results of statistical physics. In order to avoid the undesired
finite-size effects, simulations are started from an artificial
initial state instead of the random strategy distribution. This
method proved to be successful for the evaluation of phase
diagrams in other three-strategy evolutionary games as well
[44]. In the present initial state, the lattice is divided into
blocks of l × l sites in a way that each block is occupied by
one of the possible ordered states selected at random.
At the end of this section we discuss the effect of the
friendliness parameter when w 	= 1/2. For this goal we have
evaluated and plotted the stable strategy frequencies in the T -S
plane for w = 0.1 and 0.9. Within the PD region, the MC data
in Fig. 6 are very close to those we obtained for w = 1/2 (see
Fig. 5). This behavior can be explained by recognizing that
AllC remains a dominated strategy in this parameter region
and the resultant two-strategy subgame (when the players
are limited to choose either AllD or WSLS) is independent
of w. Notice, furthermore, that this two-strategy subgame is
equivalent to a PD game where the WSLS strategy represents
the cooperative behavior with rescaled T and S payoffs.
Evidently, w dependence in the stationary strategy frequencies
appears at higher noise levels when AllC players appear in the
system due to the fluctuations. At the same time, w dependence
of the strategy frequencies becomes relevant in the low-noise
limit in the hawk-dove parameter region (S > 0 and T > 1)
where AllC and AllD players form a sublattice ordered spatial
structure. Readers can observe the relevant variations in the
stationary states when comparing the plots of Fig. 5 and 6.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE IMITATION RULE
In the general properties of the above-discussed model
both the existence of the potential and the application of
the logit rule have played a crucial role. Replacing the logit
rule by pairwise imitation results in several very important
consequences. As imitation is similar to the contact process
[45–47], this model has three (homogeneous) absorbing states
from which the system cannot escape. The existence of
absorbing state(s) implies the appearance of critical phase
transitions that is realized by the extinction of one or two
strategies when tuning the parameters. These critical phase
transitions exhibit general features and belong to the directed
percolation universality class [34,48,49].
The visualization of the strategy distribution’s evolution
on the square lattice clearly illustrates that the AllC strategy
dies out within a short transient period independently of the
initial state. Subsequently, the model becomes a two-strategy
(AllD and WSLS) PD game that was studied previously by
many authors (for a survey see Ref. [5]), particularly in the
case of S = 0. Figure 7 shows the very narrow coexistence
region between the homogeneous WSLS and AllD domains.
It is worth mentioning that the stationary state can be reached
in the limit N → ∞ more effectively by starting the system
from an artificial initial state [44] as described above.
Until now, the systematic analysis of the effects of noise is
limited to the weak PD games (S = 0) for several connectivity
networks [49,50]. The present model behaves similarly. The
coexistence regions are limited by two threshold values, that
is, WSLS and AllD coexist if Tc1(S,K) < T < Tc2(S,K). In
the light of the latter results, one can expect similar behavior
for other S and K parameters as well. To be more accurate, we
expect that [Tc2(S,K) − Tc1(S,K)] → 0 if K goes to ∞.
At low noises the systematic analysis of the extinction of
AllD strategies goes beyond the scope of the present work
due to the extremely slow relaxation processes resembling a
branching-unifying random walk of the isolated AllD players.
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Frequency of the WSLS strategy as a
function of T at S = −0.5 for different noise levels when imitation
update rule is applied.
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Stationary strategy frequencies in the T -S
plane for any w parameter value when imitation rule is applied. The
color code for the strategies is the same as in Fig. 5.
The MC data are illustrated in Fig. 8 when imitation dynamics
is applied for the given region of the T -S plane for K = 0.1.
As AllC players are out of the game, the parameter w no
longer plays a role, thus we obtain the same phase diagram
for all w values.
Figure 8 illustrates clearly that the homogeneous WSLS
phase is expanded towards the hawk-dove region (T > 1 and
S > 0) where the imitation of the nearest neighbor is not
capable of building up the sublattice-ordered arrangements
of AllD and AllC strategies that are preferred for the logit rule.
In the absence of WSLS, a previous analysis [51] indicated a
low level of cooperation depending on the actual values of T
and S. It is more important, however, that the WSLS phase is
extended towards the regions in the PD area where the logit
rule predicted the dominance of AllD. This phenomenon is
related to the cross-dependent components that do not affect
the individual decisions in the case of the logit rule. On the
contrary, for imitation, cooperators reward each other via the
cross-dependent payoffs and the resultant extra profit helps
them invade the AllD territories along the interfaces as it
is demonstrated in the first spatial models [24,52]. On the
other hand, the present stochastic rule makes the interfaces
irregular that favors the spreading of defection. Despite the
latter mechanism, the present simulations clearly indicate the
positive impact of the imitation dynamics in the maintenance
of cooperative (WSLS) behavior. In the light of previous results
(surveyed in Ref. [5]), one can expect even more significant
suppression of defection when other connectivity structures
(e.g., square lattice with nearest and next-nearest neighbor
interactions) are chosen.
VI. SUMMARY
We have studied a three-strategy spatial evolutionary
prisoner’s dilemma game with imitation and logit update
rules where players could follow the always-cooperating,
always-defecting or the win-stay-lose-shift strategy. Players
were located on a square lattice and gained their payoff from
games with their nearest neighbors. The payoff matrix of the
game was built by introducing a friendliness parameter w
of the WSLS strategy. It is found that for a suitable choice
of the friendliness parameter (w = 1/2) the uniform 3 × 3
game becomes equivalent to a potential game. In this case,
when the logit rule is applied, the behavior of the system in
the low-noise limit is determined by the potential and can
be evaluated analytically. Additionally, we have demonstrated
the applicability of the concepts of decomposition [15],
distinguishing four types of elementary games that explain the
different noise dependence along the phase boundaries where
the potential permits the existence of two ordered strategy
arrangements.
The analytical results served as references when consid-
ering the effects of noise and w for the logit rule as well
as when the evolution is controlled by stochastic pairwise
imitation. During the systematic comparison of the effects we
faced the negligibility of the cross-dependent payoffs for the
logit rule, whereas these components played an important role
for imitation by supporting the maintenance of cooperation.
Until now the systematic analysis of multiagent evolution-
ary games with many strategies is limited to models where the
payoff matrix is defined by several parameters. The concept
of matrix decomposition (particularly for potential games)
presents us tools to analyze the general features of games. It can
be useful even for imitation when several strategies die out and
the system develops into a symmetric two-strategy subgame
that is always a potential game [15]. In some sense, the
systematic investigation of the effects of payoff components is
similar to the study of the two-strategy subgames [53]. In the
present model the latter approach has explained the absence
of w dependence in the PD parameter region. These methods
can serve as important precursors to understand and classify
spatial games involving a large number of parameters.
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